

WIRELESS NETWORKS : AUTHENTICATION VIA BIOMETRIC VIDEO- OBJECT STEGANOGRAPHY

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Abstract-Remote authentication involves the submission of encrypted information, along with visual and audio cues (facial images/videos, human voice, and so on). This paper proposes a robust authentication mechanism based on semantic segmentation, chaotic encryption, and data hiding. Assuming that user X wants to be remotely authenticated, initially X's video object (VO) is automatically segmented, using a head-and-body detector. Next, one of X's biometric signals is encrypted by a secure force algorithm. Afterwards, the encrypted signal is inserted to the most significant wavelet coefficients of the VO, using its qualified significant wavelet trees (QSWTs). QSWTs provide both invisibility and significant resistance against lossy transmission and compression, conditions that are typical of wireless networks. Finally, the inverse discrete wavelet transform is applied to provide the stego-object. Experimental results regarding: 1) security merits of the proposed encryption scheme; 2) robustness to steganalytic attacks, to various transmission losses and JPEG compression ratios; and 3) bandwidth efficiency measures indicate the promising performance of the proposed biometrics-based authentication scheme.

Keywords- Biometrics hiding, steganographic system, remote authentication, QSWTs, video object

I. INTRODUCTION

Authentication involve confirming the identity of a person or software program, tracing the origin of an artifact, or ensuring that a product is what its packaging and labeling claims to be, confirming the truth of an attribute of a datum or entity. The two main directions in the authentication field are positive and negative authentication. Positive authentication is well-established and it is applied by the majority of existing authentication systems. Negative authentication has been invented to reduce cyber attacks. The difference is explained by the following example: Let assume password-based authentication. In positive authentication, the passwords of all users that are authorized to access a system are stored, usually in a file. Thus the passwords space includes only users passwords and it is usually limited (according to the number of users). If crackers receive the passwords file, then their work is to recover the plaintext of a very limited number of passwords. On contrary, in negative authentication the anti-password space is created, (theoretically) containing all strings that are not in the passwords file. If crackers receive the very large anti-password file, their work will be much harder. This way, negative authentication can be introduced as a new layer of protection to enhance existing security measures within networks. This allows the current infrastructure to remain intact without accessing the stored passwords or creating additional vulnerabilities. By applying a real-valued negative selection algorithm, a different layer is added for authentication, preventing unauthorized users from gaining network access [1].

The proposed scheme is a positive authentication system and for security reasons elements from at least

two, and preferably all three, of the following factors should be verified:

- the ownership factor: Something the user has (e.g. ID card, security token, cell phone etc.)
- _ the knowledge factor: Something the user knows (e.g., a password, a PIN, a pattern etc.)
- _ the inherence factor: Something the user is or does (e.g., fingerprint, retinal pattern, DNA sequence, face, other biometric identifier etc.)

The security based on passwords or smart cards has pros and cons, the use of biometrics is suggested as an alternative. Biometrics have already been incorporated in remote authentication, [2] but only as password substitution in smart cards. In order to investigate their full potentiality, biometrics can be incorporated in hybrid crypto-steganographic schemes. In particular, cryptographic algorithms can scramble biometric signals so that they cannot be understood, while steganographic methods can hide the encrypted biometric signals so that they cannot be seen. In this paper we build further on this principle to confront the problem of remote human authentication over wireless channels, under loss tolerant protocols. In particular an effective wavelet-based steganographic method is proposed for hiding encrypted biometric signals into semantically meaningful VOs such as the head-and-shoulders VO, which is common in several teleconferencing applications.

II. RELATED WORK AND CONTRIBUTION

A. REMOTE AUTHENTICATION

Different solutions have been proposed. For instance, Liao et al. [3] proposed a scheme that utilizes the Diffie-

Hellman key agreement protocol over insecure networks, which allows the user and the system to agree on a session key to encrypt/decrypt their communicated messages using a symmetric cryptosystem. However several passwords are simple and they can be easily guessed or broken. Furthermore, most people use the same password across different applications; if a malicious user determines a single password, they can access multiple applications. Additionally: users should always have their smart cards with them in order to do transactions, if a user loses his/hersmart card, he/she will not be able to do any transactions and should wait for the reissuing of the card (sometimes several days).

B. STEGANOGRAPHIC METHODS

Steganographic algorithms can be roughly divided into those performed in the spatial domain and those applied in a transform domain. Among transform-based data hiding approaches, DCT [4] and DWT [5] methods are, by far, the most popular since they are related with popular digital image and video compression schemes (i.e., JPEG, MPEG, JPEG-2000, H264, etc). In [6] fingerprints are hidden in the region of interest of images. Both DFT and DWT domains are examined. However, again, no encryption is incorporated. Object-oriented data hiding is more secure and robust against deciphering attacks but it usually creates visually sensitive artifacts, thus, lowering the capacity of encryption. Detection of skin like color and feature descriptors are quite robust but rarely lead to large compact objects, reducing further encryption capacity.

C. CONTRIBUTION OF CURRENT WORK

To summarize the contents of this paper, in contrast to existing methods mentioned in the previous sections, its main contributions are analyzed below:

1) *Biometrics-based human authentication over wireless channels under fault-tolerant protocols*: The overriding majority of current works does not consider fault-tolerant protocols during transmission of stego-objects. With the proposed approach several mobile applications could benefit. For example, in an emerging scenario, let us imagine that a user would like to be authenticated via her cell phone, tablet etc. Her mobile device has a camera, while its touch-screen collaborates with a fingerprints capturing application. In case the signal strength is low, erroneous packets may arrive at the receiver. Thus, a scheme like the proposed one is required.

2) *Automatic extraction of semantically meaningful video objects embedding the encrypted biometric information*: Most of the existing schemes do not consider semantically meaningful VOs as hosts, but a whole image. The proposed scheme offers some possible advantages. Firstly, the scheme provides a secondary complementary authentication mechanism in case when the person under authentication is also captured by the

camera. Thus her face and body is transmitted together with another biometric feature for possible double authentication. Secondly, in every recent transaction, the overall architecture can store the latest sample pictures of one's face and body. This could help in cases of hybrid remote authentication, when both a machine and a human remotely authenticate a person. The machine can authenticate the fingerprint and the human can authenticate the face (like the teller does in a bank). Another advantage has to do with more efficient bandwidth usage, especially in the aforementioned case of hybrid remote authentication. An image usually does not only contain semantically meaningful information but also background blocks. On the other hand, in order to hide a specific amount of information, a host with proper capacity should be selected. If the host is an image, then irrelevant blocks will also be transmitted, occupying valuable bandwidth. On the contrary, when the host is a semantic VO, all transmitted information is relevant to the authentication task. Last but not least, the proposed scheme allows for more efficient rate control and can better confront traffic congestions. On the other hand, the proposed scheme is content-aware. In case of traffic congestion, the rate control mechanism could discard blocks from the body region that do not also contain hidden information, instead of discarding face areas.

3) *Secure force algorithm which works like a one-time pad, to encrypt biometric identifiers*: Symmetric encryption is faster, thus in contemporary systems a key of size $2n$ bits is produced (usually $n/2$ [6 11]) and it is exchanged between the communicating entities, using public key cryptography. However, even though large keys are considered to be safe, it has been proven that any cipher with the perfect secrecy property must use keys with effectively the same requirements as one-time pad keys. In our case, biometric identifiers are encrypted by a secure force algorithm. In the proposed scheme this exchange is also performed by incorporating public key cryptography.

III. THE PROPOSED METHOD

The proposed remote human authentication scheme over wireless channels under loss tolerant transmission protocols, aims to ensure: (a) robustness against deciphering, noise and compression, (b) good encryption capacity, and (c) ease of implementation. For this purpose we: (a) employ wavelet-based steganography, (b) encrypt biometric signals to allow for natural authentication, (c) involve a Chaotic Pseudo-Random Bit Generator (C-PRBG) to create the keys that trigger the whole encryption to increase security, and (d) the encrypted biometric signal is hidden in a VO, which can reliably be detected in modern applications that involve teleconferencing. Initially the biometric signal is encrypted by incorporating a chaotic pseudo-random bit generator and a chaos-driven cipher, based on mixed

feedback and time variant S-boxes. The use of such an encryption mechanism is justified since,

- 1) Chaos presents sensitivity to initial conditions,
- 2) A C-PRBG statistically works very well as a one-time pad generator,
- 3) Implementations of popular public key encryption methods, such as RSA or El Gamal, cannot provide suitable encryption rates. This is why almost all of the contemporary encryption algorithms combine symmetric and public key cryptography. On the other hand the security of these algorithms relies, in theory, on the difficulty of quickly factorizing large numbers or solving the discrete logarithm problem, and, in practice, on the difficulty of recording acoustic emanations from computers during operation.
- 4) Private-key bulk encryption algorithms such as Triple-DES or Blowfish, similarly to chaotic algorithms, are more suitable for transmission of large amounts of data.




Figure 1: data flow in the proposed scheme

Afterwards, a head-and-body image of the biometric signal's owner is analyzed and the host VO is automatically extracted based on the method proposed in [7]. Next a DWT-based algorithm is proposed for hiding the encrypted biometric signal to the host VO. The proposed algorithm hides the encrypted information into the largest-value QSWTs of energy-efficient pairs of subbands. Compared to other related schemes, the incorporated approach has the following advantages [8]:

- _ it is one of the most efficient algorithms of literature that facilitates robust hiding of visually recognizable patterns,
- _ it is hierarchical and has multiresolution characteristics,
- _ the embedded information is hard to detect by the human visual system (HVS),
- _ it is among best known techniques with regards to survival of hidden info after image compression.

Initially the extracted host object is decomposed into two levels by the separable 2-D wavelet transform, providing three pairs of subbands (HL2, HL1), (LH2, LH1) and (HH2, HH1). Afterwards, the pair of subbands with the highest energy content is detected and a QSWTs approach is incorporated [9] in order to select the coefficients where the encrypted biometric signal should be casted. Finally, the signal is redundantly embedded to

both subbands of the selected pair, using a non-linear energy adaptable insertion procedure. Differences between the original and the stego-object are imperceptible to the human visual system (HVS), while biometric signals can be retrieved even under compression and transmission losses.

IV. CHAOTIC ENCRYPTION

Before hiding, each biometric signal is initially encrypted.

A. ENCRYPTION KEYS' GENERATION

In this paper, the generated key has size equal to the size of each biometric signal. Each key is generated by a C-PRBG. In this paper we propose a PRBG based on a triplet of chaotic systems, which can provide higher security than other C-PRBGs [10]. The basic idea of the C-PRBG is to generate pseudo-random bits by mixing three different and asymptotically independent chaotic orbits. Towards this direction let $F1(x1; p1)$, $F2(x2; p2)$ and $F3(x3; p3)$ be three different 1-D chaotic maps:

$$x1(i+1) = F1(x1(i); p1)$$

$$x2(i+1) = F2(x2(i); p2)$$

$$x3(i+1) = F3(x3(i); p3)$$

where $p1$, $p2$ and $p3$ are control parameters, $x1(0)$, $x2(0)$ and $x3(0)$ are initial conditions and $x1(i)$, $x2(i)$, $x3(i)$ denote the three chaotic orbits. Then a pseudo-random bit sequence can be defined as:

$$1 \quad F3(x1(i); p3) > F3(x2(i); p3)$$

$$k(i) \quad k(i-1)F3(x1(i); p3) = F3(x2(i); p3) \quad (1)$$

$$0 \quad F3(x1(i); p3) < F3(x2(i); p3)$$

According to this scheme the generation of each bit is controlled by the orbit of the third chaotic system, having as initial conditions the outputs of the other two chaotic systems [12].

B. THE ENCRYPTION MECHANISM

After generating the initial pseudo-random key, the cipher module is activated. Before encryption, the samples of each biometric signal are properly ordered. In case of 1-D signals (e.g. voice) the order is defined by the sequence of samples, while in 2-D signals (e.g. fingerprint image) pixels are line per line zig-zag scanned from top-left to bottom-right, providing plain text pixels Pi . Assume that Pi and Ci represent the i -th plain text and i -th ciphertext samples respectively (both in n -bit formats). Then the encryption procedure is defined by:

$$Ci = fS(fS(Pi; i) \text{ XOR } xi; i) \quad (2)$$

Where $fS(Pi; i)$ are time-variant $n \times n$ S-boxes (bijections defined on $0; 1; \dots; 2n - 1$) and xi is produced from the states of three chaotic functions through the bit generation procedure defined in Eq. 1.

C. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE CHAOTIC ENCRYPTION SCHEME

For each biometric signal a key that has size equal to the size of the signal to be encrypted is produced. In particular, the first component of the proposed encryption module is the C-PRBG, which controls the encryption process. This component depends on three secret control parameters p_1 , p_2 and p_3 and three secret initial conditions $x_1(0)$, $x_2(0)$ and $x_3(0)$. These six variables are exchanged between the sender and receiver using public-key cryptography.

D. DECRYPTION

The decryption module receives at its input a vector of encrypted samples, the initial control parameters and initial conditions for the triplet of chaotic maps (C-PRBG module) and the initial cipher value C_0 (used at the first feedback). The procedure is terminated after the final samples are decrypted.

V. HIDING THE ENCRYPTED BIOMETRIC SIGNAL

The encrypted biometric signal is robustly hidden in the host video object. QSWTs provide one of the most robust solutions to data recovery, after several signal processing manipulations. In particular, let us assume that the host video object has been extracted using the method described in [7]. Next, the host video object is decomposed into two levels using the shape-adaptive discrete wavelet transform (SA-DWT) [11]. By applying the SA-DWT on a set of arbitrary shape, four parts of low, middle, and high frequencies, i.e., $LL1$, $HL1$, $LH1$, $HH1$, are produced. Band $LL1$ ($HH1$) includes low (high) frequency components both in horizontal and vertical direction, while the $HL1$ ($LH1$) includes high (low) frequencies in horizontal direction and low (high) frequencies in vertical direction. Subband $LL1$ can be further decomposed in a similar way into four different subbands, denoted as $LL2$, $HL2$, $LH2$, $HH2$ respectively.

Algorithm 1 QSWTs Estimation

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1: procedure QSWTest( $I$ ;  $S$ ;  $L$ )
2: /*  $I$  = input frame */
3: /*  $S$  = subband selection (e.g.  $LH$ ) */
4: /*  $L$  = subband level (e.g. 3) */
5: /* Thresholds  $T_1$  and  $T_2$  are globally defined */
6: [ $LL$ ;  $LH$ ;  $HL$ ;  $HH$ ] = DWT( $S$ ;  $L$  - 1)
7:  $SL-1 = LH$ 
8: [ $LL1$ ;  $LH1$ ;  $HL1$ ;  $HH1$ ] = DWT( $LL$ ; 1)
9:  $SL = LH1$ 
10:  $t = 0$ 
11:  $QSWT[t] = \phi$ 
12:  $N = rows(SL)$ 
13:  $M = columns(SL)$ 
14: for  $i = 1$  to  $N$  do
15: for  $j = 1$  to  $M$  do
16: if  $SL(i, j)$  is In_Node AND  $|SL(i, j)| > T_1$  then

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17:  $C_1 = SL-1(2i - 1; 2j - 1)$  is In_Node AND  $|SL-1(2i - 1; 2j - 1)| > T_2$ 
18:  $C_2 = SL-1(2i - 1; 2j)$  is In_Node AND  $|SL-1(2i - 1; 2j)| > T_2$ 
19:  $C_3 = SL-1(2i; 2j - 1)$  is In_Node AND  $|SL-1(2i; 2j - 1)| > T_2$ 
20:  $C_4 = SL-1(2i; 2j)$  is In_Node AND  $|SL-1(2i; 2j)| > T_2$ 
21: if ( $C_1$  AND  $C_2$  AND  $C_3$  AND  $C_4$ ) then
22:  $QSWT[t] = SL(i, j) + SL-1(2i - 1; 2j - 1) + SL-1(2i - 1; 2j) + SL-1(2i; 2j - 1) + SL-1(2i; 2j)$ 
23:  $t = t + 1$ 
24: return  $QSWT$ 

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VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION

For evaluation purposes, the proposed video object-oriented biometric signals hiding scheme is examined in terms of security, effectiveness and robustness. The general methodology included: (a) extraction of the host video object from a videoconference frame and detection of the QSWTs to embed the encrypted signal, (b) encryption of the fingerprint, (c) embedding of the encrypted signal to the host video object, (d) compression of the final content and simulated noisy transmission, (e) decompression and extraction of the encrypted signal, (f) decryption and (g) authentication.

VII. LIMITATIONS OF PROPOSED SCHEME

In this paper, a robust remote authentication mechanism based on semantic segmentation, chaotic encryption and data hiding has been presented.




FIGURE 4. Indicative results: (a) The 1st video frame, (b) The (assumed) fingerprint, (c) Encrypted biometric signal, (d) The automatically extracted video object, (e) stego-object containing the encrypted biometric signal of Fig. 4c, (g) Decryption of pattern of Fig. 4c using a key that differs by just one bit.

Even though several successful experiments have been carried out, the proposed scheme has still its limitations and open issues, which should be further investigated in future research. In particular:

- Since the recipient should possess the original host video object, the method is non-blind, a feature that is undesirable in some specific applications.
- Secure force algorithm encryption is a relatively new field of research, and it will take some time for its security analysis to mature.
- In case of the C-PRBG, even though several combinations of control parameters have been tried, a systematic theory about chaos in discrete space is needed.

The iteration of the chaotic systems implies working with real numbers. Since our implementation is done with finite precision arithmetic, round-off operations could lead to a non-invertible encryption procedure.

Last but not least, the steganographic scheme is based on QSWTs. Thus if an image has several homogeneous areas, then either its capacity or its robustness may be greatly reduced.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Biometric signals enter more and more into our everyday lives, to their use in accomplishing usage (e.g. citizen authentication). Thus there is an urgent need to further develop and integrate biometric authentication techniques into practical applications. In future research, the effects of compression and mobile transmission of other hidden biometric signals (e.g. voice or iris) should also be examined. The problem of lost biometric data is also of high interest.

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